WellBeing International

WBI Studies Repository
1982

Bureaucracy and Wildlife: A Historical Overview
Edward E. Langenau
Michigan Department of Natural Resources

Follow this and additional works at: https://www.wellbeingintlstudiesrepository.org/acwp_all
Part of the Animal Studies Commons, Nature and Society Relations Commons, and the Population
Biology Commons

Recommended Citation
Langenau, E.E. (1982). Bureaucracy and wildlife: A historical overview. International Journal for the Study
of Animal Problems, 3(2), 140-157.

This material is brought to you for free and open access
by WellBeing International. It has been accepted for
inclusion by an authorized administrator of the WBI
Studies Repository. For more information, please contact
wbisr-info@wellbeingintl.org.

I:!ll"'

S.R. Kellert- Wildlife Management

References
Cart, T.W. (1971) The Struggle for Wild-

life Protection in the United States,
1870-1900: Attitudes and Events Leading to the Lacey Act. University Microfilms, Ann Arbor, MI.
Krutch, J.W. (1970) The Best Nature Writing of joseph Wood Krutch. Pocket

Review Article

Books, New York, NY.
Leopold, A. (1968) Sand County Almanac. Oxford University Press, New
York, NY.
Peterson, R.T. (1981) New wildlife unit
faces many obstacles, New York
Times, September 27, 1981.

Bureaucracy and Wildlife:
A Historical Overview
Edward E. Langenau, Jr.
This paper provides a framework for understanding the Government's position
on many wildlife topics, including humane ethics. The historical role of Government
in wildlife conservation is traced in relation to pertinent theories of bureaucracy. It is
shown that Government involvement in wildlife conservation increased through successive stages of change because of interest group activity.
These periods of increased Government involvement in wildlife matters are
shown to have followed periods of resource exploitation. Recurrent cycles of exploitation, accompanied by economic prosperity, have then been followed by attitudes favorable to conservation and political activism. This, in turn, has produced periods of
backlash when the public rejected Government regulation, which has then caused another period of exploitation.
However, the process of Government regulation works such that the losses during the periods of backlash have been of far lesser magnitude than the amount of permanent change introduced during major increments in growth of regulation. This paper
shows that most of the permanent change in Government has been institutionalized
through the creation of new staff within agencies who represent the position of interest groups on various issues. Direct communication between these internal staffs
and their associated interest groups, special-purpose legislative appropriation, and
advisory commissions, have given these organizations the appearance of independent regulatory agencies. This system has tended to produce a tension between the
old and new roles of Government in wildlife conservation and has increased agency
reliance on regulatory rules for making decisions.
Dr. Langenau is a wildlife research biologist at the Michigan Department of Natural Resources, Rose Lake
Wildlife Research Center, 8562 East Stoll Road, East Lansing, Ml 48823. Portions of this paper were presented at a symposium entitled "Wildlife Management in the United States: Scientific and Humane Issues
in Conservation Programs." This symposium was held in St. Louis, MO at the Annual Meeting of The Humane Society of the United States on October 14, 1981.
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Introduction

county, township, and city programs for
wildlife conservation, allow us to estiIn order to engage in any meaningmate that nearly $1 billion is spent each
ful discussion about wildlife issues in
year by Government on wildlife programs
the United States, it is helpful to have
in the United States.
some understanding of the history of GovThe purpose of this paper is to trace
ernment's role in wildlife matters. This is
the historical development of this sizebecause wildlife conservation in this
able bureaucracy, to examine the relationcountry has been strongly affected by
ship between public behavior and Governgovernmental policy and action. Wildment response, and to analyze the essenlife in the United States is considered as
tial nature of wildlife-related bureaucracy
a public matter (or "good"), like national
in relation to theories of public adminisdefense and public education. Wildlife
tration. This analysis should provide us
benefits and conservation programs are
with a better appreciation of the tension
distributed throughout the political sysbetween the biological and political ditem by legislative mandate in accormensions of current wildlife conservation
dance with the demands of voters and
decisions. It will also be helpful in underinterest groups. As a result, a bald eagle
standing the inherent dilemma of Governnesting in a Michigan white pine belongs
ment in trying to, on the one hand, reequally as well to a textile worker in
spond to the will of the people while at
South Carolina, a Senator in Oregon,
the same time ensuring sufficient conand an automaker in Detroit.
tinuity of policy regarding the enhanceHowever, wildlife is considered a
ment of wildlife resources. This perspecprivate good in many nations; governive should also be useful in identifying
ment in these countries assumes quite
the channels that have been used successdifferent roles in this regard. Discussion
fully throughout history to create social
of wildlife issues in these nations there- change.
fore requires less knowledge of governColonial Customs
ment and history. Wildlife benefits are
distributed throughout their economic
The early explorers and colonists
systems according to the laws of supply who arrived in this country found wildand demand, and wildlife, like timber life to be abundant. Their initial period
and livestock, is assumed to belong to of hardship and starvation here has been
private landowners.
attributed to a lack of knowledge rather
The public nature of policy toward than to a shortage of available game
wildlife in the United States has created (Graham, 1947). Many of the English and
the need for a sizeable bureaucracy. The Dutch commoners had no experience in
Wildlife Management Institute reported hunting and fishing, since these were
that in 1979, wildlife budgets were $40 privileges of the ruling classes in Europe.
million for the U.S. Forest Service, $17 With experience, and with assistance of
million for the Bureau of Land Manage- the Indians, the colonists soon developed
ment, and $289.5 million for the U.S. Fish a number of customs regarding the propand Wildlife Service. Hunting license er relationship of humans to wildlife.
revenues totaled $199 million for the 50
Not all of these customs reflected
States, and $94 million was available to much sophistication about biological
the States from Federal excise taxes on facts. For example, Trefethen (1964) disammunition and firearms. These dollar cussed colonial attitudes toward predaamounts, in addition to those that are tors. He argued that the English settlers,
not reported for other Federal, State, unlike the French in Canada who adapted
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their society to wilderness conditions,
tried instead to replace the wilderness
with a village "landscape of spired towns
and cleared land filled with cattle and
sheep." At that time, many colonial laws
and customs were based on reducing the
threat of predators, especially the timber
wolf. Bounties were paid for the scalps
of predators, as early as 1629 (Kellert
and Westervelt, 1981 ). Colonists were
often required to tend wolf pits, set out
poison, and participate in wolf-killing
drives. Virginia established a tax on Indian tribes, calculated according to the
number of available hunters, which was
to be paid in wolf scalps to the colonial
Government (Trefethen, 1964).
Although many rules were passed before 1677, this year is normally cited as
the date when the first game law was
passed (Palmer, 1912). At that time, Connecticut limited the number of months
during which deer could be taken and
also prohibited the export of game meat
and hides. Certain methods of hunting
were also prohibited, first by Maryland
in 1730: it was made illegal to hunt deer
by firelight. Many colonies prohibited
hunting on Sunday. Uniform fines were
also passed for violations; for example, a
fine of 5 British pounds was associated
with violating the 1646 law in Portsmouth.
Half of this fine went to the person making
the arrest and half to the town treasury.
By 1720, nearly all of the colonies
had some type of game law in force. According to British mandate, each town
was to appoint local individuals as "informers of the deer." These were later
denoted as "deer wardens" in 1739 in
Massachusetts, and then as "deer reeves"
in 1764. These early laws were passed
with little political initiative and were
met with limited resistance from the
public, since they were designed to restrict only the most flagrant of outcasts,
who were thought to pose a threat to the
food supply of early settlements. But
more important, these laws constituted
142
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statements of consensus about values
concerning wildlife that reflected certain elements in the Puritan ethic.

Western Exploration
Expansion westward was motivated,
in part, by a search for water routes and
precious metals, political conflict over
American land among several interested
European powers, and by missionary attempts to convert the Indians. However,
the primary motive was interest in furs.
The history of colonization has shown
that most development involved the export of luxury items for waiting markets
in Europe. In a sense, then, it was aristocrats in Europe who created a significant
demand for western exploration in America. Pelts of bear, elk, deer, martin, raccoon, mink, muskrat, opossum, lynx, wolf,
and fox were shipped to Europe in great
quantity. But the most important fur was
the beaver pelt, which was used for the
broad-brimmed hats that were fashionable in the late 1600's and early 1700's.
Beaver and otter pelts were shipped from
the colonies to Europe as early as 1621
(Trefethen, 1964).
Much of the fur trade had a direct
economic impact on the governments of
Europe. It was common practice at the
time for rulers to sell monopolistic fur
rights to trading companies, in exchange
for flat payments of substantial size. In
turn, the fur companies established trading posts in their assigned regions, to buy
pelts from Indians and from unlicensed
fur dealers, the "coureurs de bois."
These white men often lived with the Indians, had Indian wives, and blatantly ignored the assignments of monopolistic
trapping rights to trading companies.
Government intervention during
these times was quite complex. French
policies vacillated between westward
expansion of fur trading posts and protection of permanent settlements along
the St. Lawrence, depending on the price
/NT
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of furs in Europe. After considerable
controversy, the Proclamation of 1696
called for the withdrawal of western
posts back to the area around the St.
Lawrence, a recall of all soldiers and settlers back from the West, and severe restrictions on the fur trade of the coureurs
de bois. However, part of the rationale
behind this proclamation can be attributed to an oversupply of beaver pelts,
which had seriously depressed prices.
The fur market gradually recovered
from the French attempts at control of
exports from America. As it did, the British expanded south and west from their
former center of trade, the Hudson Bay
area. Vast areas of land in the West were
conveyed to the British colonies by charter from the Crown of England. This
caused a series of intense wars between
the French and British for control of the
interior fur trade. The British were victorious; at the Peace of Paris in 1763
they received all of the former French
territory east of the Mississippi. Spain
was given New Orleans, as well as all
former French land west of the Mississippi.
British policy after the wars was formulated to keep the Indians contented:
like the French, an attempt was made by
the English to restrict western encroachment of white settlers onto Indian lands.
Therefore, the Proclamation of 1763 restricted settlers from going west of the
Alleghenies, and British officials were
appointed to regulate fur prices to make
sure that Indians were not cheated. Alicensing system was imposed on fur traders, and the Proclamation nullified many
land claims of the colonies in the West.
Government activities, as these related to wildlife matters during western
exploration, were rarely concerned about
the conservation of resources or social
values, in contrast to the wildlife protectionist measures introduced in early colonial times. Wildlife legislation was now
based on competition for profits, control
of economic prices, relationships betNT I STUD ANIM PROB 3(2) 1982
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tween Indians and settlers, and colonial
domination by European powers. Unlike
the earlier period, a significant amount
of public resentment and resistance was
associated with this new legislation.
Some of this resentment coalesced into
the fervor for independence that eventually led to the American Revolution.

Eastern Exploitation
One of the first jobs of the new Federal Government after the end of the Revolutionary War was to decide upon the
disposition of land claims in the West
that had been made by the original colonies. Six of the original States, led by
Maryland, had no western land claims
and refused to ratify the 1778 Articles of
Confederation, unless the other States
relinquished their rights to western land.
Various proposals were debated; it was
finally resolved that these lands would
remain as a public domain that was owned
by the United States as a whole. According to the subsequent land ordinance of
1785, these lands would be surveyed and
sold to the public with the revenue used
to support the activities of the Federal
Government.
This concept about the role of the
early Government is consistent with the
thinking of our founding fathers (Fiader,
1976). They saw land management as an
enterprise for private citizens, not as an
appropriate function of government.
Policies related to the transfer of land
previously held in the public domain to
individuals reflected John Locke's position that government should work to secure human rights and Thomas Jefferson's concept that government should
foster the pursuit of individual happiness. Land was seen as a means of ensuring both individual self-sufficiency and
personal freedom. The assumption behind
this policy was that husbandry of resources could be accomplished by applying discernible natural laws to manipulation of the environment.
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These attitudes had three immediate
consequences. First, there was serious
concern over the exact description of
natural laws, because Jefferson, Madison, Franklin, and others were actively
involved in interpreting the results of
their own formal experiments on logging,
plowing, fertilizing, and crop rotation to
maintain soil values. Next, there was a
rapid acquisition of land in the West;
this land was subsequently transferred
to individuals. The Government also acquired a vast amount of land between
1803 and 1853 by the Lou is ian a Purchase,
the conquest of Mexico, the treaty with
England, and by accessions from Spain,
Texas, and Mexico. The U.S. Government
had wanted much of this land because of
certain ancillary goals, such as control
of harbors and ports, railroad construction, and protection of the fur trade. The
Government attached no great value to
the land itself and only promoted western expansion because it had an excess
of land- which might as well be soldand a shortage of cash. The third effect
was that the emphasis on productivity
and manipulation of land encouraged unchecked exploitation of natural resources
(Fiader, 1976).
The eastern states were the first to
suffer serious abuses of natural resources.
There was overgrazing of ranges, indiscriminate exploitation of minerals, highgrading of timber, and various practices
that led to soil erosion. No controls on
exploitation of this type had been part
of the colonial customs (as compared with
concerns about wildlife, as noted above);
nor had settlement laws been used to
control the fur take or fur prices during
the periods of French and British rule.

Eastern Protectionism
Soon, however, citizens began to
realize the effects of abuse of resources
and reduction of wildlife population,
and new measures for protection of these
144

resources in the several eastern States
were introduced. Many laws were passed
to restrict the length of hunting seasons
(Palmer, 1912). For example, Massachusetts established hunting seasons for
snipe in 1818, New Jersey for rabbits in
1820, and New Hampshire (in 1821) for
beaver, mink, and otter. Maine established
a moose hunting season in 1830, Pennsylvania set a season on squirrels in
1841, and the hunting of screech owls
was regulated in New Jersey in 1850.
This trend toward protection was
associated with an increased public concern about natural resources. It also coincided with the advent of special-interest groups. During the 1840's, a wave of
reforming zeal swept across the United
States. This was influenced by "Jacksonian Democracy," which called for greater
public participation in Government. Aspects of this new fervor included the
movement to abolish slavery, an anti-Catholic movement, the Temperance crusade,
and a concern about women's rights.
About this time, wildlife issues also
began to receive attention. The earliest
wildlife group, the New York Association for the Protection of Game, was
organized in 1844. This, and other wildlife interest groups, assumed "quasipolice powers" (Trefethen, 1961) and made
legislative recommendations directly to
the States.

Western Exploitation
During the mid-1800's, there were
conflicting trends: resources were beginning to be protected in the East, while
exploitation continued in the West. This
resulted in the advent of a major industry- market hunting- which began in
1850 and peaked in the 1880's. Game
meat taken by professional hunters who
·had given up farming and ranching was
sold in western markets. The Civil War
helped the industry by creating a market
for game meat to feed both armies. Then,
/NT
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when railroads reached the West and population increased, game prices rose and
attracted eastern hunters and entrepreneurs. In the late 1880's, railroads going
east carried large amounts of game meat
and hides.
The effects of this market hunting
industry, and the corresponding public
feeling that wildlife supplies were virtually unlimited, are now legendary. The
passenger pigeon, whose population had
been estimated at 10 billion in 1840, was
exterminated. Hunters shot indiscriminately into flocks so large they darkened
the sky- in one case, a single flock contained over 2 million birds. A more effective method for market hunters was
to build smudge fires in the birds' roosts.
Nestlings, prized as squab, were thereby
suffocated; blinded adults were driven
out of roosts and caught in large nets. By
1890 the species was nearly extinct. To a
great extent, the demise of this species
was caused by overhunting, but extensive
depletion of the hardwoods, on which it
depended for acorns, also contributed
to its inability to survive. The last passenger pigeon in existence died on September 1, 1914 in the Cincinnati Zoological Garden (Trefethen, 1964;
Schoger, 1955).
The bison is another well-known
victim of resource exploitation. It was
doomed by the advent of the railroad,
which effectively divided the total herd
into two populations, northern and southern, and also provided ready access for
bison products to distant markets. Buffalo were slaughtered by the millions by
men who considered a take of 50 a day
to be a poor average. Often, only the
tongues and hide were actually used. In
1872 and 1873 the railroads originating
in Kansas shipped 1,250,000 hides to eastern tanneries; in 1882 the Northern Pacific Railroad alone shipped 200,000 buffalo hides. By 1880 the huge herds had
essentially disappeared and the prairie
landscape of the bison was forever alter/NT
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ed (Trefethen, 1964; Allen, 1954).
The passenger pigeon and bison were
not the only species to be affected by
market hunting. In the early 1890's, railroad stations in North Dakota were I ined
with ducks, and it was not unusual to see
carloads of spoiled birds dumped in warm
weather (Gustafson eta/., 1940). In addition to waterfowl, there was a significant
market for deer, rabbits, antelope, and
elk. A large trade in women's millinery
also developed a market for the nuptial
plume feathers of herons, and ornamental quills and breast feathers of pelicans,
gulls, egrets, and grebes. These "plume
birds" nested in colonies, and large numbers were killed on their breeding grounds.

Public Involvement
The early sportsmen's groups, formed
during the 1840's, expanded in size and
number as a response to the growth in
market hunting. By 1900, there were 374
of these groups in the United States. Scientists concerned with the effects of exploitation also organized into groups,
for example, the American Fish Culturist's
Association (1870) and the American Ornithological Union (1883). The American
Humane Association, a national federation of humane societies, was formed in
1877 and supported the protection of
plume birds that was then being promoted by actress Minnie M. Fiske, the
AOU, and the New York Zoological Society. Many Audubon societies, preservation groups, and horticulture associations were also formed during this period; the American Forestry Association
appeared in 1875 and the Sierra Club
was established in 1892.
In addition to the appeals by such
formal organizations for regulation of resource abuse, the general public was becoming aware of some of the scientific
and esthetic issues entailed in wildlife
conservation. Henry William Herbert, writing under the pen name of Frank Foster,
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These attitudes had three immediate
consequences. First, there was serious
concern over the exact description of
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to individuals. The Government also acquired a vast amount of land between
1803 and 1853 by the Lou is ian a Purchase,
the conquest of Mexico, the treaty with
England, and by accessions from Spain,
Texas, and Mexico. The U.S. Government
had wanted much of this land because of
certain ancillary goals, such as control
of harbors and ports, railroad construction, and protection of the fur trade. The
Government attached no great value to
the land itself and only promoted western expansion because it had an excess
of land- which might as well be soldand a shortage of cash. The third effect
was that the emphasis on productivity
and manipulation of land encouraged unchecked exploitation of natural resources
(Fiader, 1976).
The eastern states were the first to
suffer serious abuses of natural resources.
There was overgrazing of ranges, indiscriminate exploitation of minerals, highgrading of timber, and various practices
that led to soil erosion. No controls on
exploitation of this type had been part
of the colonial customs (as compared with
concerns about wildlife, as noted above);
nor had settlement laws been used to
control the fur take or fur prices during
the periods of French and British rule.

Eastern Protectionism
Soon, however, citizens began to
realize the effects of abuse of resources
and reduction of wildlife population,
and new measures for protection of these
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resources in the several eastern States
were introduced. Many laws were passed
to restrict the length of hunting seasons
(Palmer, 1912). For example, Massachusetts established hunting seasons for
snipe in 1818, New Jersey for rabbits in
1820, and New Hampshire (in 1821) for
beaver, mink, and otter. Maine established
a moose hunting season in 1830, Pennsylvania set a season on squirrels in
1841, and the hunting of screech owls
was regulated in New Jersey in 1850.
This trend toward protection was
associated with an increased public concern about natural resources. It also coincided with the advent of special-interest groups. During the 1840's, a wave of
reforming zeal swept across the United
States. This was influenced by "Jacksonian Democracy," which called for greater
public participation in Government. Aspects of this new fervor included the
movement to abolish slavery, an anti-Catholic movement, the Temperance crusade,
and a concern about women's rights.
About this time, wildlife issues also
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wildlife group, the New York Association for the Protection of Game, was
organized in 1844. This, and other wildlife interest groups, assumed "quasipolice powers" (Trefethen, 1961) and made
legislative recommendations directly to
the States.

Western Exploitation
During the mid-1800's, there were
conflicting trends: resources were beginning to be protected in the East, while
exploitation continued in the West. This
resulted in the advent of a major industry- market hunting- which began in
1850 and peaked in the 1880's. Game
meat taken by professional hunters who
·had given up farming and ranching was
sold in western markets. The Civil War
helped the industry by creating a market
for game meat to feed both armies. Then,
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when railroads reached the West and population increased, game prices rose and
attracted eastern hunters and entrepreneurs. In the late 1880's, railroads going
east carried large amounts of game meat
and hides.
The effects of this market hunting
industry, and the corresponding public
feeling that wildlife supplies were virtually unlimited, are now legendary. The
passenger pigeon, whose population had
been estimated at 10 billion in 1840, was
exterminated. Hunters shot indiscriminately into flocks so large they darkened
the sky- in one case, a single flock contained over 2 million birds. A more effective method for market hunters was
to build smudge fires in the birds' roosts.
Nestlings, prized as squab, were thereby
suffocated; blinded adults were driven
out of roosts and caught in large nets. By
1890 the species was nearly extinct. To a
great extent, the demise of this species
was caused by overhunting, but extensive
depletion of the hardwoods, on which it
depended for acorns, also contributed
to its inability to survive. The last passenger pigeon in existence died on September 1, 1914 in the Cincinnati Zoological Garden (Trefethen, 1964;
Schoger, 1955).
The bison is another well-known
victim of resource exploitation. It was
doomed by the advent of the railroad,
which effectively divided the total herd
into two populations, northern and southern, and also provided ready access for
bison products to distant markets. Buffalo were slaughtered by the millions by
men who considered a take of 50 a day
to be a poor average. Often, only the
tongues and hide were actually used. In
1872 and 1873 the railroads originating
in Kansas shipped 1,250,000 hides to eastern tanneries; in 1882 the Northern Pacific Railroad alone shipped 200,000 buffalo hides. By 1880 the huge herds had
essentially disappeared and the prairie
landscape of the bison was forever alter/NT
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ed (Trefethen, 1964; Allen, 1954).
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gulls, egrets, and grebes. These "plume
birds" nested in colonies, and large numbers were killed on their breeding grounds.
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number as a response to the growth in
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of these groups in the United States. Scientists concerned with the effects of exploitation also organized into groups,
for example, the American Fish Culturist's
Association (1870) and the American Ornithological Union (1883). The American
Humane Association, a national federation of humane societies, was formed in
1877 and supported the protection of
plume birds that was then being promoted by actress Minnie M. Fiske, the
AOU, and the New York Zoological Society. Many Audubon societies, preservation groups, and horticulture associations were also formed during this period; the American Forestry Association
appeared in 1875 and the Sierra Club
was established in 1892.
In addition to the appeals by such
formal organizations for regulation of resource abuse, the general public was becoming aware of some of the scientific
and esthetic issues entailed in wildlife
conservation. Henry William Herbert, writing under the pen name of Frank Foster,
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reached millions of Americans with the
message that wildlife should be used for
recreation and not for commerce. The
public was also becoming acquainted
with the works of Audubon. Wilson. and
The public discontent that resulted
from these new ideas produced a flurry
of Government activity. The game protection trend moved westward: Wisconsin established a hunting season for
prairie chickens in 1851, California for
elk in 1852, and Idaho for bison in 1864.
The first law on a bag limit, which restricts the number of animals taken per
day, was passed by Iowa in 1878. Some
legislation was also enacted at the State
level concerning non-game birds (Palmer,
1902). In 1850, both Connecticut and
New Jersey passed laws making it illegal
to kill insectivorous birds. Other States
followed, with laws aimed at protection
of "songbirds" or "harmless" birds.
Plume birds and seabirds were first protected by Florida in 1877, and in 1897
California made it illegal to possess, or
wear, the plumage or skin of several birds.
State governments also responded
to this new public demand by establishing special agencies to consider fish and
game matters. The first State Fish and
Game Commissions were created in New
Hampshire and California during 1878.
The right of the States to enact their own
separate legislation on wildlife, however, did not go unchallenged. But in
1896, a U.S. Supreme Court case, Geer
vs. Connecticut (161 U.S. 569), upheld
the authority of States in this area. The
principle that wildlife is a public good,
implied in the Magna Carta of 1215, had
been legally upheld by the highest court
in the United States. The idea that government should assume control over wildlife management, even on private land,
might not have evolved if we had not
had such great quantities of publicly
held land in the United States. By contrast, countries where wildlife is treated
as a private good and considered as the
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landowner's property had proportionately
less public land at the time when their
wildlife legislation was first being formulated.
The first professional officials for
enforcing wildlife legislation appeared
during this period. Before this time, early game laws had been enforced by local
police officers, who received part of
their salaries from fines, or by political
appointees, such as the deer wardens in
Massachusetts (1739). These new professionals were first seen in 1887, when
Michigan, Minnesota, and Wisconsin
created full-time salaried positions. The
appropriate State agencies were correspondingly structured so as to provide
enforcement powers for regulation.
Public involvement in the politics
of resource management also made a
significant impact on the Federal Government. In 1871, Congress created the
U.S. Commission on Fish and Fisheries.
The Timber Culture Act of 1873 gave
homestead owners an additional 160
acres, if they agreed to plant and cultivate 40 acres of trees over a period of
10 years. The combined efforts of wildlife-oriented humanists, scientists, hunting groups, legislators, and Government
officials culminated in the Lacey Act of
1900, which prohibited interstate traffic
in birds killed in violation of State law.
Many States had by that time passed
laws for protection of wildlife, but these
were being openly violated by market
hunting industries. The Lacey Act brought
an end to this era, destroyed the market
hunting industry, and demonstrated the
power that is inherent in the political
process when groups with different interests unite to press for a common
cause (Cart, 1971 ).

Regulatory Theory
Bernstein's (1955) theory has been
used to explain the creation of formal
regulatory agencies, like the Interstate
Commerce Commission, which were orINTI STUD ANIM PROB 3(2) 1982
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ganized during the same time period as
the wildlife agencies. It proposes that
there is a series of stages through which
regulatory agencies pass until they
reach their final end-point- obsolescence. Initially, there is some sort of
publicly expressed disagreement with an
industry. People then become organized
and present their concerns about the
problem to legislators. The usual legislative response is to create an independent agency, outside the executive
branch of Government, to deal with the
problem. After the agency has been set
up, public interest in the issues tends to
become less intense. The legislature
then reduces the amount of financial
support given the agency, in accordance
with waning public interest. At the same
time, the regulated industry will have
spent a considerable sum to influence
the newly created agency. In the process, the agency comes to depend upon
the industry it was created to regulate
and thereby becomes "captured." With
time, the industry finds that it no longer
needs the agency and reduces its support; soon, the regulatory agency is
dissolved.
The historical development of wildlife management agencies fits only the
first part of this model. A large number
of interest groups were attempting to reduce the volume of market hunting, which
was a powerful industry in the 1880's.
Disagreement on this specific issue was
expressed to legislators as one element
in this era of widespread reformation,
and new agencies, which received little
administrative control from State governors, were created. Funding of these
agencies was subsequently linked to
hunting interests when several States,
beginning with North Dakota, required
hunting licenses in 1895. It is at this
point that the broad pattern in the historical evolution of wildlife regulation
departs from the model, for this action
induced increased, rather than reduced
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activity by interest groups after the creation of new agencies. As a result, the
market hunting industry was virtually
destroyed. The interest groups, and not
industry, had captured the agencies.
This was best evidenced by the appointment of Major W.A. Wadsworth, president of the Boone and Crockett Club, as
director of New York Fish and Game
Commission. The subsequent "wedding"
of Government and sportsmen in 1900,
when Teddy Roosevelt became governor of New York, laid the foundation for
control of Government by interest groups
(Trefethen, 1961 ).
Stigler (1971 ), in arguing against Bernstein's theory on the independence of
regulatory agencies, suggested that industry actively seeks Government regulation for four basic reasons: (1) to control entry of new firms, (2) to reduce effects of market substitutes, (3) to generate direct subsidies, and (4) to have
price controls enforced by coercive
power. Applying Stigler's approach to
the area of wildlife concerns, and assuming that interest groups also seek
regulation, four parallel effects can be
generated. Interest groups would desire
regulation so that the entry of other interest groups into the political arena
could be controlled by the agency. Substitute land-use products, like timber
and agricultural goods, would have reduced value. Regulation might also be
sought so that non-wildlife interests
would subsidize wildlife agencies. Finally, game laws would be enforced by
police-like agencies.
This modification of Stigler's theory
seems to fit quite well with the actual
practice of wildlife agencies in the early
1900's. At that time, interest groups actively sought regulation and initiated a
considerable amount of legislation: a
total of 1,324 game laws were passed in
the United States, between 1900 and 1910
(Pal mer, 1912). Many of these I aws appear
to relate to the above-mentioned rea147
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from these new ideas produced a flurry
of Government activity. The game protection trend moved westward: Wisconsin established a hunting season for
prairie chickens in 1851, California for
elk in 1852, and Idaho for bison in 1864.
The first law on a bag limit, which restricts the number of animals taken per
day, was passed by Iowa in 1878. Some
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1902). In 1850, both Connecticut and
New Jersey passed laws making it illegal
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followed, with laws aimed at protection
of "songbirds" or "harmless" birds.
Plume birds and seabirds were first protected by Florida in 1877, and in 1897
California made it illegal to possess, or
wear, the plumage or skin of several birds.
State governments also responded
to this new public demand by establishing special agencies to consider fish and
game matters. The first State Fish and
Game Commissions were created in New
Hampshire and California during 1878.
The right of the States to enact their own
separate legislation on wildlife, however, did not go unchallenged. But in
1896, a U.S. Supreme Court case, Geer
vs. Connecticut (161 U.S. 569), upheld
the authority of States in this area. The
principle that wildlife is a public good,
implied in the Magna Carta of 1215, had
been legally upheld by the highest court
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might not have evolved if we had not
had such great quantities of publicly
held land in the United States. By contrast, countries where wildlife is treated
as a private good and considered as the
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landowner's property had proportionately
less public land at the time when their
wildlife legislation was first being formulated.
The first professional officials for
enforcing wildlife legislation appeared
during this period. Before this time, early game laws had been enforced by local
police officers, who received part of
their salaries from fines, or by political
appointees, such as the deer wardens in
Massachusetts (1739). These new professionals were first seen in 1887, when
Michigan, Minnesota, and Wisconsin
created full-time salaried positions. The
appropriate State agencies were correspondingly structured so as to provide
enforcement powers for regulation.
Public involvement in the politics
of resource management also made a
significant impact on the Federal Government. In 1871, Congress created the
U.S. Commission on Fish and Fisheries.
The Timber Culture Act of 1873 gave
homestead owners an additional 160
acres, if they agreed to plant and cultivate 40 acres of trees over a period of
10 years. The combined efforts of wildlife-oriented humanists, scientists, hunting groups, legislators, and Government
officials culminated in the Lacey Act of
1900, which prohibited interstate traffic
in birds killed in violation of State law.
Many States had by that time passed
laws for protection of wildlife, but these
were being openly violated by market
hunting industries. The Lacey Act brought
an end to this era, destroyed the market
hunting industry, and demonstrated the
power that is inherent in the political
process when groups with different interests unite to press for a common
cause (Cart, 1971 ).

Regulatory Theory
Bernstein's (1955) theory has been
used to explain the creation of formal
regulatory agencies, like the Interstate
Commerce Commission, which were orINTI STUD ANIM PROB 3(2) 1982
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ganized during the same time period as
the wildlife agencies. It proposes that
there is a series of stages through which
regulatory agencies pass until they
reach their final end-point- obsolescence. Initially, there is some sort of
publicly expressed disagreement with an
industry. People then become organized
and present their concerns about the
problem to legislators. The usual legislative response is to create an independent agency, outside the executive
branch of Government, to deal with the
problem. After the agency has been set
up, public interest in the issues tends to
become less intense. The legislature
then reduces the amount of financial
support given the agency, in accordance
with waning public interest. At the same
time, the regulated industry will have
spent a considerable sum to influence
the newly created agency. In the process, the agency comes to depend upon
the industry it was created to regulate
and thereby becomes "captured." With
time, the industry finds that it no longer
needs the agency and reduces its support; soon, the regulatory agency is
dissolved.
The historical development of wildlife management agencies fits only the
first part of this model. A large number
of interest groups were attempting to reduce the volume of market hunting, which
was a powerful industry in the 1880's.
Disagreement on this specific issue was
expressed to legislators as one element
in this era of widespread reformation,
and new agencies, which received little
administrative control from State governors, were created. Funding of these
agencies was subsequently linked to
hunting interests when several States,
beginning with North Dakota, required
hunting licenses in 1895. It is at this
point that the broad pattern in the historical evolution of wildlife regulation
departs from the model, for this action
induced increased, rather than reduced
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activity by interest groups after the creation of new agencies. As a result, the
market hunting industry was virtually
destroyed. The interest groups, and not
industry, had captured the agencies.
This was best evidenced by the appointment of Major W.A. Wadsworth, president of the Boone and Crockett Club, as
director of New York Fish and Game
Commission. The subsequent "wedding"
of Government and sportsmen in 1900,
when Teddy Roosevelt became governor of New York, laid the foundation for
control of Government by interest groups
(Trefethen, 1961 ).
Stigler (1971 ), in arguing against Bernstein's theory on the independence of
regulatory agencies, suggested that industry actively seeks Government regulation for four basic reasons: (1) to control entry of new firms, (2) to reduce effects of market substitutes, (3) to generate direct subsidies, and (4) to have
price controls enforced by coercive
power. Applying Stigler's approach to
the area of wildlife concerns, and assuming that interest groups also seek
regulation, four parallel effects can be
generated. Interest groups would desire
regulation so that the entry of other interest groups into the political arena
could be controlled by the agency. Substitute land-use products, like timber
and agricultural goods, would have reduced value. Regulation might also be
sought so that non-wildlife interests
would subsidize wildlife agencies. Finally, game laws would be enforced by
police-like agencies.
This modification of Stigler's theory
seems to fit quite well with the actual
practice of wildlife agencies in the early
1900's. At that time, interest groups actively sought regulation and initiated a
considerable amount of legislation: a
total of 1,324 game laws were passed in
the United States, between 1900 and 1910
(Pal mer, 1912). Many of these I aws appear
to relate to the above-mentioned rea147
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sons why wildlife interest groups might
actively seek regulation.

Progressivism
Wildlife conservation became a serious part of the machinery of the Federal Government during the administration of Teddy Roosevelt. This man, well
known for his adventures in war and wilderness, was more than just a big-game
hunter. He was also a perceptive naturalist and a talented organizer. In 1888 he
founded the Boone and Crockett Club
with 100 members, many of whom were
influential in business, politics, and the
military. All of the members were biggame hunters who had an ingrained respect for the natural environments of
the grizzly bear, elk, deer, caribou, and
moose. It was only natural that many of
these hunting friends would be placed in
high positions when Roosevelt was elected in 1901. Immediate changes were
made. The Biological Su·rvey was positioned at a higher administrative level.
In 1905, the United States Forest Service
was created and given to Pinchot, a
member of Roosevelt's club and the
father of American forestry. The term
"conservation" was coined by Pinchot
or his assistant, Prince, in 1907 and became the cornerstone of policy in the
Roosevelt administration. The original
definition of conservation, "wise use,
without waste," became the slogan of
Government bureaus, as well as many
interest groups.
The policy on land in the public domain also changed during these years.
Yellowstone National Park had been designated in 1872 as an area where hunting and timber cutting were prohibited.
Often, these restrictions were ignored
until the Yellowstone Park Protection
Act was passed in 1894. President Harrison had designated 13 million acres of
land as a public forest reserve in 1891.
Afognak Island, Alaska, was declassified
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as a forest preserve in 1892 and then designated as a salmon preserve by the
U.S. Bureau of Fisheries; finally, it was
established as a Wildlife Refuge for sea
lions and sea otters. President Roosevelt
continued this policy of placing land
within the public domain. In 1903 the
first National Wildlife Refuge was
created on Pelican Island, Florida, to
protect plume birds. During the rest of
his administration, vast holdings of land
were transferred to the national forest
reserve, national wildlife refuge system,
and national park system.
One of the most significant events
of the Roosevelt administration was the
White House Conference of Governors
in 1908. This represented one aspect of a
broad alliance that was built up between
the Federal and State governments during
the early 1900's. The chief idea to
emerge from this meeting was that natural resources could be utilized under a
system of management, rather than simply be preserved or protected. After the
meeting, a list of resolutions was enacted,
41 State conservation commissions were
formed, and 50 commissions of national
organizations were organized. The first
North American Conservation Conference
was held in 1909 (Graham, 1947).
The Roosevelt and Wilson administrations operated under a philosophy of
progressivism, in which the powers of
Government were used to counteract or
control the growing concentration of private power. The immediate effect of this
effort was an increase in the strength of
the public interest groups that had been
created after the era of Jacksonian Democracy in the 1840's. This policy also
facilitated expansion of the bureaucracy
organized to handle conservation issues,
as the Federal Government withdrew large
tracts of land from private hands and
placed them once again in the public
domain.
Flader (1976) has argued that the
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Roosevelt administration, and its intellectual leaders like Pinchot, Powell (of
the U.S. Geological Survey), and McGee
(from the Inland Waterways Commission),
have been given too much credit for the
conservation movement that evolved at
the turn of the century. She has stated
that citizens themselves had petitioned
the Government to preserve pristine
areas, for recreational opportunities and
for resource protection, and that this
sentiment was later "co-opted" by administrators who sought to formulate a
rational framework for managing land
production systems on behalf of the public benefit. This view is consistent with
some of the theories of government regulation previously discussed.

Renewed Exploitation
Difficulties in generating congressional support for progressive reform
began to appear during the latter part of
Roosevelt's term. Congress failed to appropriate money for the National Conservation Commission and also stopped
the scientific bureaus from doing any
commission work. This trend continued
under Wilson's administration, although
the major setback for natural resource
management came with World War I.
Not only was national attention diverted
from conservation, but conflict also legitimized exploitation under the guise of
support for war-related industrial activity. Some legislation was passed, despite
the war, such as the bill that created the
National Park Service in 1916 and the
Migratory Bird Treaty in 1918, which
made it illegal to shoot waterfowl during
spring.
After the war, exploitation of resources continued and became one element in the great burst of economic prosperity during the 1920's. Kellert and Westervelt (1981) noted a peak of interest in
wildlife, as measured by the number of
animal-related articles in newspapers,
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during the 1920's. They attributed this to
a variety of factors, including the automobile, which suddenly made the wilderness accessible to many people. But
there was also a boom in wheat prices,
leading to increased production at the
expense of soil, timber, and wildlife. In
addition, industrial growth had reduced
the number of farms and increased the
need for recreational use of land. Fur~
ther, the major growth of wildlife agencies within Government had begun to
show a real decline from the rampant increases seen during the Progressive Era.

The New Deal
The Great Depression, and the New
Deal policy of Government control to
remedy economic problems, gave power
back to the conservation agencies. The
basic pre-war trends in conservation
were therefore re-activated in the 1930's.
Agencies were structured bureaucratically by division of labor, authority was
allocated according to rank and expertise, and employees were given expanded
civil service protection. New agencies,
like the Soil Conservation Service, were
created, as wer~ public works projects
like the Civilian Conservation Corps.
Many laws were passed at the Federal
and State levels involving forestry, grazing, parks, fisheries, and soil conservation. The most notable measure involving
wildlife was the Pittman-Robertson Act
of 1937- excise taxes on firearms and
ammunition were to be collected at the
Federal level and then returned to the
States for restoration of wildlife.
Kellert and Westervelt (1981) found
a second peak of interest in wildlife during the 1930's. They attributed this trend
to a renewed demand for, and interest in,
protectionism. Major drainage of wetlands in the early 1900's, which was followed by drought and dustbowls, and
overhunting during the 1920's, aroused
the concern of a broad spectrum of peo149
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known for his adventures in war and wilderness, was more than just a big-game
hunter. He was also a perceptive naturalist and a talented organizer. In 1888 he
founded the Boone and Crockett Club
with 100 members, many of whom were
influential in business, politics, and the
military. All of the members were biggame hunters who had an ingrained respect for the natural environments of
the grizzly bear, elk, deer, caribou, and
moose. It was only natural that many of
these hunting friends would be placed in
high positions when Roosevelt was elected in 1901. Immediate changes were
made. The Biological Su·rvey was positioned at a higher administrative level.
In 1905, the United States Forest Service
was created and given to Pinchot, a
member of Roosevelt's club and the
father of American forestry. The term
"conservation" was coined by Pinchot
or his assistant, Prince, in 1907 and became the cornerstone of policy in the
Roosevelt administration. The original
definition of conservation, "wise use,
without waste," became the slogan of
Government bureaus, as well as many
interest groups.
The policy on land in the public domain also changed during these years.
Yellowstone National Park had been designated in 1872 as an area where hunting and timber cutting were prohibited.
Often, these restrictions were ignored
until the Yellowstone Park Protection
Act was passed in 1894. President Harrison had designated 13 million acres of
land as a public forest reserve in 1891.
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as a forest preserve in 1892 and then designated as a salmon preserve by the
U.S. Bureau of Fisheries; finally, it was
established as a Wildlife Refuge for sea
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continued this policy of placing land
within the public domain. In 1903 the
first National Wildlife Refuge was
created on Pelican Island, Florida, to
protect plume birds. During the rest of
his administration, vast holdings of land
were transferred to the national forest
reserve, national wildlife refuge system,
and national park system.
One of the most significant events
of the Roosevelt administration was the
White House Conference of Governors
in 1908. This represented one aspect of a
broad alliance that was built up between
the Federal and State governments during
the early 1900's. The chief idea to
emerge from this meeting was that natural resources could be utilized under a
system of management, rather than simply be preserved or protected. After the
meeting, a list of resolutions was enacted,
41 State conservation commissions were
formed, and 50 commissions of national
organizations were organized. The first
North American Conservation Conference
was held in 1909 (Graham, 1947).
The Roosevelt and Wilson administrations operated under a philosophy of
progressivism, in which the powers of
Government were used to counteract or
control the growing concentration of private power. The immediate effect of this
effort was an increase in the strength of
the public interest groups that had been
created after the era of Jacksonian Democracy in the 1840's. This policy also
facilitated expansion of the bureaucracy
organized to handle conservation issues,
as the Federal Government withdrew large
tracts of land from private hands and
placed them once again in the public
domain.
Flader (1976) has argued that the
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Roosevelt administration, and its intellectual leaders like Pinchot, Powell (of
the U.S. Geological Survey), and McGee
(from the Inland Waterways Commission),
have been given too much credit for the
conservation movement that evolved at
the turn of the century. She has stated
that citizens themselves had petitioned
the Government to preserve pristine
areas, for recreational opportunities and
for resource protection, and that this
sentiment was later "co-opted" by administrators who sought to formulate a
rational framework for managing land
production systems on behalf of the public benefit. This view is consistent with
some of the theories of government regulation previously discussed.

Renewed Exploitation
Difficulties in generating congressional support for progressive reform
began to appear during the latter part of
Roosevelt's term. Congress failed to appropriate money for the National Conservation Commission and also stopped
the scientific bureaus from doing any
commission work. This trend continued
under Wilson's administration, although
the major setback for natural resource
management came with World War I.
Not only was national attention diverted
from conservation, but conflict also legitimized exploitation under the guise of
support for war-related industrial activity. Some legislation was passed, despite
the war, such as the bill that created the
National Park Service in 1916 and the
Migratory Bird Treaty in 1918, which
made it illegal to shoot waterfowl during
spring.
After the war, exploitation of resources continued and became one element in the great burst of economic prosperity during the 1920's. Kellert and Westervelt (1981) noted a peak of interest in
wildlife, as measured by the number of
animal-related articles in newspapers,
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during the 1920's. They attributed this to
a variety of factors, including the automobile, which suddenly made the wilderness accessible to many people. But
there was also a boom in wheat prices,
leading to increased production at the
expense of soil, timber, and wildlife. In
addition, industrial growth had reduced
the number of farms and increased the
need for recreational use of land. Fur~
ther, the major growth of wildlife agencies within Government had begun to
show a real decline from the rampant increases seen during the Progressive Era.

The New Deal
The Great Depression, and the New
Deal policy of Government control to
remedy economic problems, gave power
back to the conservation agencies. The
basic pre-war trends in conservation
were therefore re-activated in the 1930's.
Agencies were structured bureaucratically by division of labor, authority was
allocated according to rank and expertise, and employees were given expanded
civil service protection. New agencies,
like the Soil Conservation Service, were
created, as wer~ public works projects
like the Civilian Conservation Corps.
Many laws were passed at the Federal
and State levels involving forestry, grazing, parks, fisheries, and soil conservation. The most notable measure involving
wildlife was the Pittman-Robertson Act
of 1937- excise taxes on firearms and
ammunition were to be collected at the
Federal level and then returned to the
States for restoration of wildlife.
Kellert and Westervelt (1981) found
a second peak of interest in wildlife during the 1930's. They attributed this trend
to a renewed demand for, and interest in,
protectionism. Major drainage of wetlands in the early 1900's, which was followed by drought and dustbowls, and
overhunting during the 1920's, aroused
the concern of a broad spectrum of peo149
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pie: recreation ists, protectionists, scientists, and humanists. In response, considerable Federal and State legislation was
enacted to arrest the deterioriation of
wildlife habitats and other natural resources.
The 1930's also saw the emergence
of a closer union between scientists and
Government decision-makers. This new
collaboration had been inspired by Franklin Roosevelt's concept of a "brain trust"
of academics who would be available for
Government consultation. The idea that
Government programs might sometimes
be considered as social experiments, a
concept explicit in the New Deal Philosophy, also had an impact on wildlife
agencies. Some began formal experiments. Universities responded appropriately, as evidenced by the publication of
Leopold's classical text Game Management in 1933 and by his title- the first
professor of wildlife management.
During this era, agencies began to
realize that regulation of the numbers of
animals taken by hunters was not alone
sufficient for effective wildlife management. Land with special wildlife value
was therefore purchased by agencies,
game-farming and stocking programs
were initiated, and attempts to control
wildlife habitats began. This period also
marked the point in the history of conservation when regulation began to be
based on principle. This two-part principle held that Government efficiency in
wildlife programs depended on adherence
to basic biological laws and that equity
in these programs depended on an equal
distribution of benefits among all of the
interest groups involved in financing the
agency. Whenever agencies faced a new
problem, this principle was utilized in
making critical decisions.

Post-War Specialization Within
Government
Developments in conservation were
arrested by World War II, which once
150
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again promoted resource abuse. Correspondingly, agencies in Government again
began to expand as the war ended and
the results of exploitation were recognized. At the same time, the number of
hunters increased and fees paid by them
provided a strong economic foundation
for wildlife management programs in
Government. Agencies began to hire resource managers who had taken advantage of the Gl Bill to attain specialized
training in this area.
This professional specialization fostered in educational centers, combined
with knowledge about the working of
division of labor gained in the military,
caused agencies to develop sub-units to
enhance efficiency. Special sections
were established at State and Federal
levels to manage big game, waterfowl,
upland game, and other groups of hunted
species. Research, laboratory, field, and
administrative functions were assigned
to assist different groups of agency employees. Separation of fish, forestry,
parks, wildlife, and enforcement duties
occurred in many agencies.
The division of labor within agencies and the presence of multiple interest groups influenced the method by
which wildlife conservation decisions
were made. The pre-war agency could
develop long-range plans because its
organizational environment was simple
and predictable. However, the uncertain
environment created by conflict and
competition among sub-units, as well as
by outside power coalitions, made this
kind of simple, rational decision-making
impossible in agencies reorganized after
World War II.
As a consequence of this uncertainty,
agencies developed rigorous data collection systems so they could monitor
the changing environment. Statistical
data banks were created to monitor the
harvest of animals, license sales, program effects, budgetary expenses, hunting accidents, and the various types of
/NT
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game law violations. Attitude surveys
were begun to determine public sentiment on controversial issues and the relative positions of the various interest
groups on significant topics. Much of
this effort can be understood as necessary for providing information to agencies
concerning changing organizational
environments and for including public
input in decision-making. It might be
concluded that the best way to understand a Government organization, during this period, was to look at its
monitoring data. And the best way to
change the agency was to request that it
collect new kinds of monitoring data.

The Ecological Revolution
The events of the 1960's and 1970's
jarred the complacency of the old wildlife conservation agencies. They became
reflective about their proper role, as new,
broad environmental legislation created
rapid growth in all of the agencies responsible for natural resource functions
other than wildlife conservation. At the
same time, powerful public interest groups
appeared in the political arena to promote complex and confusing demands
concerning the environment. Hunter
populations also changed with the advent
of a new group of recreationists, who
came from urban and suburban areas
and who had had no family tradition in
hunting. New biologists were hired by
agencies and some communication probe
!ems developed because of the differences in training and attitudes between
these individuals and the more senior
biologists who had been recruited right
after World War II.
Kellert and Westervelt (1981) found
an increase in the number of animalrelated newspaper articles during the
1960's. They considered a wide diversity
of antecedents for this trend, including
the influence of President john F. Kennedy, who criticized the Eisenhower administration for its lack of an environtNT
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mental conscience. Stuart L. Udall, a dedicated conservationist, was appointed
as Secretary of the Interior. In 1962
Rachel Carson's book Silent Spring wa~
pub! ished, became a best-seller, and had
a major impact on public attitudes.
There were also a number of dramatic
and well-publicized environmental tragedies in the 1960's, inc! ud ing oi I spi lis
from the wreck of the Torrey Canyon
and from an off-shore drilling accident
in the Santa Barbara Channel.
Federal legislation enacted during
this period reflected this public concern
over broad issues related to natural resource management. Major new efforts
included the Sikes Act (1960), the Refuge
Recreation Act (1962), the Wilderness
Act (1964), the Water Resources Planning
Act (1965), the Land and Water Conservation Fund Act (1965), the Federal Water Quality Act (1967), and the Wild and
Scenic Rivers Act (1968).
Wildlife conservation agencies soon
became painfully aware of the growth in
competing Government bureaus. It was
in this context that such agencies admitted during the 1970's that their programmatic emphasis to date had been on hunting programs, and that they had failed to
serve the larger public. Certain policy
changes therefore resulted. In response
to public demand, many States developed systems for collecting wildlife revenues from recreationists who did not
hunt. The Federal Government developed an Endangered Species Program to
provide aid to the States, and the
Wildlife Management Institute promoted a Federal aid program for nongame species. Most important, the idea
that wildlife conservation agencies
should be involved in the management
of biological communities, rather than
simply be concerned about selected
populations of species, gained acceptance at this time. In fact, though, this
idea had been around for some time.
The legitimacy of hunting was also
151
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pie: recreation ists, protectionists, scientists, and humanists. In response, considerable Federal and State legislation was
enacted to arrest the deterioriation of
wildlife habitats and other natural resources.
The 1930's also saw the emergence
of a closer union between scientists and
Government decision-makers. This new
collaboration had been inspired by Franklin Roosevelt's concept of a "brain trust"
of academics who would be available for
Government consultation. The idea that
Government programs might sometimes
be considered as social experiments, a
concept explicit in the New Deal Philosophy, also had an impact on wildlife
agencies. Some began formal experiments. Universities responded appropriately, as evidenced by the publication of
Leopold's classical text Game Management in 1933 and by his title- the first
professor of wildlife management.
During this era, agencies began to
realize that regulation of the numbers of
animals taken by hunters was not alone
sufficient for effective wildlife management. Land with special wildlife value
was therefore purchased by agencies,
game-farming and stocking programs
were initiated, and attempts to control
wildlife habitats began. This period also
marked the point in the history of conservation when regulation began to be
based on principle. This two-part principle held that Government efficiency in
wildlife programs depended on adherence
to basic biological laws and that equity
in these programs depended on an equal
distribution of benefits among all of the
interest groups involved in financing the
agency. Whenever agencies faced a new
problem, this principle was utilized in
making critical decisions.

Post-War Specialization Within
Government
Developments in conservation were
arrested by World War II, which once
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again promoted resource abuse. Correspondingly, agencies in Government again
began to expand as the war ended and
the results of exploitation were recognized. At the same time, the number of
hunters increased and fees paid by them
provided a strong economic foundation
for wildlife management programs in
Government. Agencies began to hire resource managers who had taken advantage of the Gl Bill to attain specialized
training in this area.
This professional specialization fostered in educational centers, combined
with knowledge about the working of
division of labor gained in the military,
caused agencies to develop sub-units to
enhance efficiency. Special sections
were established at State and Federal
levels to manage big game, waterfowl,
upland game, and other groups of hunted
species. Research, laboratory, field, and
administrative functions were assigned
to assist different groups of agency employees. Separation of fish, forestry,
parks, wildlife, and enforcement duties
occurred in many agencies.
The division of labor within agencies and the presence of multiple interest groups influenced the method by
which wildlife conservation decisions
were made. The pre-war agency could
develop long-range plans because its
organizational environment was simple
and predictable. However, the uncertain
environment created by conflict and
competition among sub-units, as well as
by outside power coalitions, made this
kind of simple, rational decision-making
impossible in agencies reorganized after
World War II.
As a consequence of this uncertainty,
agencies developed rigorous data collection systems so they could monitor
the changing environment. Statistical
data banks were created to monitor the
harvest of animals, license sales, program effects, budgetary expenses, hunting accidents, and the various types of
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game law violations. Attitude surveys
were begun to determine public sentiment on controversial issues and the relative positions of the various interest
groups on significant topics. Much of
this effort can be understood as necessary for providing information to agencies
concerning changing organizational
environments and for including public
input in decision-making. It might be
concluded that the best way to understand a Government organization, during this period, was to look at its
monitoring data. And the best way to
change the agency was to request that it
collect new kinds of monitoring data.

The Ecological Revolution
The events of the 1960's and 1970's
jarred the complacency of the old wildlife conservation agencies. They became
reflective about their proper role, as new,
broad environmental legislation created
rapid growth in all of the agencies responsible for natural resource functions
other than wildlife conservation. At the
same time, powerful public interest groups
appeared in the political arena to promote complex and confusing demands
concerning the environment. Hunter
populations also changed with the advent
of a new group of recreationists, who
came from urban and suburban areas
and who had had no family tradition in
hunting. New biologists were hired by
agencies and some communication probe
!ems developed because of the differences in training and attitudes between
these individuals and the more senior
biologists who had been recruited right
after World War II.
Kellert and Westervelt (1981) found
an increase in the number of animalrelated newspaper articles during the
1960's. They considered a wide diversity
of antecedents for this trend, including
the influence of President john F. Kennedy, who criticized the Eisenhower administration for its lack of an environtNT
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mental conscience. Stuart L. Udall, a dedicated conservationist, was appointed
as Secretary of the Interior. In 1962
Rachel Carson's book Silent Spring wa~
pub! ished, became a best-seller, and had
a major impact on public attitudes.
There were also a number of dramatic
and well-publicized environmental tragedies in the 1960's, inc! ud ing oi I spi lis
from the wreck of the Torrey Canyon
and from an off-shore drilling accident
in the Santa Barbara Channel.
Federal legislation enacted during
this period reflected this public concern
over broad issues related to natural resource management. Major new efforts
included the Sikes Act (1960), the Refuge
Recreation Act (1962), the Wilderness
Act (1964), the Water Resources Planning
Act (1965), the Land and Water Conservation Fund Act (1965), the Federal Water Quality Act (1967), and the Wild and
Scenic Rivers Act (1968).
Wildlife conservation agencies soon
became painfully aware of the growth in
competing Government bureaus. It was
in this context that such agencies admitted during the 1970's that their programmatic emphasis to date had been on hunting programs, and that they had failed to
serve the larger public. Certain policy
changes therefore resulted. In response
to public demand, many States developed systems for collecting wildlife revenues from recreationists who did not
hunt. The Federal Government developed an Endangered Species Program to
provide aid to the States, and the
Wildlife Management Institute promoted a Federal aid program for nongame species. Most important, the idea
that wildlife conservation agencies
should be involved in the management
of biological communities, rather than
simply be concerned about selected
populations of species, gained acceptance at this time. In fact, though, this
idea had been around for some time.
The legitimacy of hunting was also
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seriously challenged during this period.
Anti-hunting groups began to make themselves heard at legislative hearings and
to use the courts to challenge existing
legislation and policy. The U.S. Fish and
Wildlife Service was taken to court over
its failure to develop an Environmental
Impact Statement on waterfowl hunting.
The Pittman-Robertson Act was challenged on the basis that non-game responses to game management programs
were not being assessed. In response to
these challenges, agencies added training in wildlife biology and sportsmanship
to hunter education courses. National
conferences on hunting ethics were held
in Charleston, North Carolina, in 1977
and in Des Moines, Iowa, in 1980 to promote appropriate agency action, guide
the drafting and proper enforcement of
legislation, and increase citizen awareness about the role of hunting in wildlife
management. Research was initiated on
non-game and endangered species and
on the effects of habitat manipulation
of biological communities.
But perhaps the most important development during the 1960's and 1970's was
the renewed emphasis on single-issue
politics. The organization of interest
groups during this time was based on the
existence of an astute group of leaders
who focused on systems of ethical values, combined with memberships who
had strong emotional involvements related to somewhat isolated issues. This
combination caused these interest groups
to search for new issues to broaden and
increase their memberships. But this process also caused some loss of control
over members, as the diversity of issues
proliferated. The types of legislation enacted, agency growth, and interest-group
activity continued to foster this issueorientation, often at the expense of considerations about broader issues related
to policy or value guidelines. When many
of these single-issue cases came to be
debated in the courts, fundamental val152

ues underlying the issues were rarely addressed, because there was only a small
constituency among these groups who
were able to discriminate between cause
and effect. It is not unusual, then, for us
to remember the 1970's in terms of muchpublicized issues like the Grand Canyon
burros, the snail darter, and de-classification of the timber wolf, along with a
variety of other case studies that tended
to obscure broader policy questions.

The New Regulation
The behavior of wildlife agencies
during this period cannot be explained
by Bernstein's model, nor by the modification of Stigler's model discussed previously in this paper. Rather, Weaver's
(1978) idea of "new regulation" seems to
provide a better fit for the events that
occurred. Weaver felt that a different
kind of regulation process was being
utilized in newer agencies, such as the
Environmental Protection Agency. In
this model, new interest groups promote
reform and thereby revitalize a particular Government agency by forcing a proportionate reduction in the influence of
the more traditional groups. The evaluation of new issues, in this model of regulation, most often involves the transfer
of power from those who produce material
products to groups of intellectual reformers who promote abstract values, new
concepts, and higher ethical standards ..
Weaver also indicated that success
in this new climate of regulation has
been achieved primarily through "internalizing the externalities." This procedure involves forcing manufacturers and
consumers to pay for the social costs involved in upgrading the processes entailed in providing goods and services. The
usual example of this policy that is cited
in the literature concerns industries that
pollute (Kneese and Schultze, 1975). Since
interest groups promoting the value of
clean air and water do not themselves pro/ NT J STUD ANIM PROB 3{2) 1982
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duce any taxable good, they do not have
the funds to provide direct support for
the Government work entailed in cleaning up the effects of pollution. Rather,
success in getting funds for the requisite
agency work has come about through
the interest group's ability to coalesce
voting power to pressure the agency. In
response, the agency charges fees to the
industries, in accordance with the new
costs of cleaning up which were not previously included in the price of goods. The
Government is thereby provided with
sufficient funds to undertake pollution
control and clean-up programs.
In reviewing the application of
Weaver's model to the actions taken by
agencies in the 1970's, there is clear
evidence of the emergence of new and
different interest groups into the political
arena, the evolution of new issues, reformation of policy and programs based
on the application of ethical values, and
corresponding attempts to reduce the
power of traditional interest groups.
There is considerable evidence that revitalization of agencies occurred as one
consequence of this process. However,
there was no evidence of internalization
of externalities seen in the wildlife politics of the 1970's.
Rather, revitalization occurred
through a system of "user-pay" Government financing. Traditional interest
groups, threatened by the advent of
newer competitive demands, requested
further regulation, just as they had done
in former times. Therefore, many wildlife bills passed in the 1970's included
special-purpose funding; in many States,
fixed percentages of funds from hunting
license revenues were earmarked for
specific purposes. Special fees, such as
those obtained from issuing State waterfowl hunting stamps, upland game bird
stamps, public access stamps, and others
were assessed for individual user groups.
This targeting of funds allowed wildlife
agencies to become increasingly inde/NT J STUD ANIM PROB 3{2) 1982
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pendent from the processes of the executive, judicial, and legislative branches
of Government.
Special-purpose funding also allowed
the concerns of outside interest groups
to gain representation within the agencies. Interest groups could then communicate directly with a staff of Government workers who would be responsive
to their particular cause, since these
workers' salaries were being paid by the
group. However, at the same time, competitive interests were often making different sorts of appeals from the outside,
through the courts and the legislatures.
These other kinds of effects, because
they lacked the economic mechanisms
for establishing internal representation
within the appropriate agencies, were
generally unsuccessful in the 1970's.

The Dominance of Economic
Concerns
In the 1980's the major wildlife issues have all involved economic considerations. Voters in the United States, by
their demonstrated preferences in the
1980 election, were expressing a concern
about the costs entailed in regulation,
about the possible effects of deficit
Government spending on inflation, and
about the cost of environmental protection and natural resource management.
Secretary Watt, Department of the Interior, announced a new trend in policy
in his speech at the 46th North American
Wildlife and Natural Resource Conference: agencies must begin to consider
the economic tradeoffs involved in the
various policies related to regulation.
State and Federal wildlife agencies
entered the 1980's in a state of fiscal crisis. Hundreds of agency positions went
unfilled throughout the Nation because
of shortages in funds. New and important programs were postponed or reduced in scope. Others were initiated
without any expectation of general fund753
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seriously challenged during this period.
Anti-hunting groups began to make themselves heard at legislative hearings and
to use the courts to challenge existing
legislation and policy. The U.S. Fish and
Wildlife Service was taken to court over
its failure to develop an Environmental
Impact Statement on waterfowl hunting.
The Pittman-Robertson Act was challenged on the basis that non-game responses to game management programs
were not being assessed. In response to
these challenges, agencies added training in wildlife biology and sportsmanship
to hunter education courses. National
conferences on hunting ethics were held
in Charleston, North Carolina, in 1977
and in Des Moines, Iowa, in 1980 to promote appropriate agency action, guide
the drafting and proper enforcement of
legislation, and increase citizen awareness about the role of hunting in wildlife
management. Research was initiated on
non-game and endangered species and
on the effects of habitat manipulation
of biological communities.
But perhaps the most important development during the 1960's and 1970's was
the renewed emphasis on single-issue
politics. The organization of interest
groups during this time was based on the
existence of an astute group of leaders
who focused on systems of ethical values, combined with memberships who
had strong emotional involvements related to somewhat isolated issues. This
combination caused these interest groups
to search for new issues to broaden and
increase their memberships. But this process also caused some loss of control
over members, as the diversity of issues
proliferated. The types of legislation enacted, agency growth, and interest-group
activity continued to foster this issueorientation, often at the expense of considerations about broader issues related
to policy or value guidelines. When many
of these single-issue cases came to be
debated in the courts, fundamental val152

ues underlying the issues were rarely addressed, because there was only a small
constituency among these groups who
were able to discriminate between cause
and effect. It is not unusual, then, for us
to remember the 1970's in terms of muchpublicized issues like the Grand Canyon
burros, the snail darter, and de-classification of the timber wolf, along with a
variety of other case studies that tended
to obscure broader policy questions.

The New Regulation
The behavior of wildlife agencies
during this period cannot be explained
by Bernstein's model, nor by the modification of Stigler's model discussed previously in this paper. Rather, Weaver's
(1978) idea of "new regulation" seems to
provide a better fit for the events that
occurred. Weaver felt that a different
kind of regulation process was being
utilized in newer agencies, such as the
Environmental Protection Agency. In
this model, new interest groups promote
reform and thereby revitalize a particular Government agency by forcing a proportionate reduction in the influence of
the more traditional groups. The evaluation of new issues, in this model of regulation, most often involves the transfer
of power from those who produce material
products to groups of intellectual reformers who promote abstract values, new
concepts, and higher ethical standards ..
Weaver also indicated that success
in this new climate of regulation has
been achieved primarily through "internalizing the externalities." This procedure involves forcing manufacturers and
consumers to pay for the social costs involved in upgrading the processes entailed in providing goods and services. The
usual example of this policy that is cited
in the literature concerns industries that
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interest groups promoting the value of
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duce any taxable good, they do not have
the funds to provide direct support for
the Government work entailed in cleaning up the effects of pollution. Rather,
success in getting funds for the requisite
agency work has come about through
the interest group's ability to coalesce
voting power to pressure the agency. In
response, the agency charges fees to the
industries, in accordance with the new
costs of cleaning up which were not previously included in the price of goods. The
Government is thereby provided with
sufficient funds to undertake pollution
control and clean-up programs.
In reviewing the application of
Weaver's model to the actions taken by
agencies in the 1970's, there is clear
evidence of the emergence of new and
different interest groups into the political
arena, the evolution of new issues, reformation of policy and programs based
on the application of ethical values, and
corresponding attempts to reduce the
power of traditional interest groups.
There is considerable evidence that revitalization of agencies occurred as one
consequence of this process. However,
there was no evidence of internalization
of externalities seen in the wildlife politics of the 1970's.
Rather, revitalization occurred
through a system of "user-pay" Government financing. Traditional interest
groups, threatened by the advent of
newer competitive demands, requested
further regulation, just as they had done
in former times. Therefore, many wildlife bills passed in the 1970's included
special-purpose funding; in many States,
fixed percentages of funds from hunting
license revenues were earmarked for
specific purposes. Special fees, such as
those obtained from issuing State waterfowl hunting stamps, upland game bird
stamps, public access stamps, and others
were assessed for individual user groups.
This targeting of funds allowed wildlife
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pendent from the processes of the executive, judicial, and legislative branches
of Government.
Special-purpose funding also allowed
the concerns of outside interest groups
to gain representation within the agencies. Interest groups could then communicate directly with a staff of Government workers who would be responsive
to their particular cause, since these
workers' salaries were being paid by the
group. However, at the same time, competitive interests were often making different sorts of appeals from the outside,
through the courts and the legislatures.
These other kinds of effects, because
they lacked the economic mechanisms
for establishing internal representation
within the appropriate agencies, were
generally unsuccessful in the 1970's.

The Dominance of Economic
Concerns
In the 1980's the major wildlife issues have all involved economic considerations. Voters in the United States, by
their demonstrated preferences in the
1980 election, were expressing a concern
about the costs entailed in regulation,
about the possible effects of deficit
Government spending on inflation, and
about the cost of environmental protection and natural resource management.
Secretary Watt, Department of the Interior, announced a new trend in policy
in his speech at the 46th North American
Wildlife and Natural Resource Conference: agencies must begin to consider
the economic tradeoffs involved in the
various policies related to regulation.
State and Federal wildlife agencies
entered the 1980's in a state of fiscal crisis. Hundreds of agency positions went
unfilled throughout the Nation because
of shortages in funds. New and important programs were postponed or reduced in scope. Others were initiated
without any expectation of general fund753
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ing revenues sufficient to supplement
anticipated recreational revenues. Energy development, agriculture, and urban
development were given precedence in
land management- doves, woodpeckers,
and rabbits were assumed to be worth
less per acre than oil, corn, or subdivisions. Internal audit procedures reinforced
this trend, since it was easier to show
economic progress from activities that
destroyed wild I ife habitats than from activities that restored the amount of living
space available to wild animals.
However, if we are correct in applying Weaver's model to the evolution of
wildlife management agencies, Government can expect continued revitalization by interest groups which request
that the social costs involved in enhancing the environment (and wildlife in particular) be incorporated into the prices
of goods and services. In some parts of
the United States, this trend has already
begun to appear. In Michigan there has
been a longstanding controversy over
exploration and drilling for oil and gas in
the Pigeon River Country State Forest
because this area has one of the only
two populations of elk east of the Mississippi River. The court decision on this
issue was that (1) drilling should be permitted in the southern part of the forest
only and (2) that biologists should work
with the oil industry to minimize the negative effects on the elk herd. Also, legislation was passed to earmark part of the
royalties gained from profits on the drilling operations for the purchase of lands
for wildlife elsewhere in Michigan. In addition, the oil company was ordered by
the courts to support agency research
on enhancement of wildlife values in the
State Forest. Resolutions like the above,
based on the principle that the cost of
externalities be included in the price of
oil, may represent a glimpse of things to
come.

Conclusions
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G i I bert (1971) proposed that the different eras in the historical development
of thinking about natural resource management coincided with changes in social theory. He proposed that an Era of
Abundance existed until 1850, because
there was little worry about supply during that period. This period was followed
by the Era of Exploitation (1850-1900)
when resource destruction occurred,
but, at the same time, restrictions to
counter preceived destruction were initiated. The next era, Preservation and Production, lasted from 1900-1935 and was
characterized by the advent of many of
our basic principles about conservation.
During 1935-1970, the Era of Harvest
and Habitat predominated. Multiple-use
philosophies arose at this time: land was
to provide the "greatest good for the
greatest number in the long run." Gilbert
denoted the next stage as the Era of
Technology, Sophistication, and Human
Management in which the users of resources, as well as the resources themselves, became the focus of attention by
managers. He speculated that we were
about to enter another Era of Exploitation, due to shortcomings in the results
achieved by the policies in force during
this last stage.
Although there are some important
differences between Gilbert's "eras"
and the stages of growth discussed in
this paper, the similarities are nevertheless clear and merit more discussion. It
has been shown that agency growth has
been principally achieved in large steps.
These stepwise increments have been
achieved by the efforts of particular interest groups, through direct communication with the responsible agencies.
Major changes in legislative appropriation for wildlife conservation have occurred most often when interest groups
and agencies have presented a unified
front in terms of policy, in conjunction
with a plan for deriving independent
revenue.
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After new programs are created,
one consequence is often an increased
level of activity among interest groups.
Younger professionals are added to the
agency staff to represent these new interests. The resulting change in agency
thinking about new and old problems is,
in turn, communicated back to the competing interest groups. Due to the nature
of the regulatory process, concerns that
are not represented internally in the
agency only enter into the decisionmaking process inasmuch as they affect
general public relations. External activity, as attempted through the courts, legislatures, or other natural-resource bureaus, has had I ittle impact on the internal behavior of the agency. Rather, decisions tend to be influenced by legislative hearings with communicators who
are already known to the agencies, and
through exposure to issues brought directly to independent advisory commissions.
Because of the special quality of this
process, agency growth between the major steps has been slow; most changes
have occurred only when new interest
group concerns come to be internalized
within an appropriate agency.
The differences in agency mission
and interest group sentiment that we
have seen evolve through time should
not obscure our vision of several important elements of continuity. Wildlife
conservation, during all historical phases,
has been essentially a regulatory process. The relevant agencies have shown
certain characteristics in their decisionmaking; these include a dependence on
principle, independence from other
branches of Government, and protection
of regulated interests.
The first of these characteristics explains why wildlife policy so often becomes a political issue, despite the presence of a scientific basis for making decisions. As discussed above, two separate
regulatory principles guide agency deci/NT 1 STUD ANIM PROB 3(2) 1982
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sions: conservation practices ought to
be based on biological facts; but also,
opportunities for wildlife benefits should
be equally distributed among all who
finance the agency. These two principles
have been used by agencies to make decisions, defend their positions, propose
innovation, and perceive newly emerging
issues. Due to the regulatory nature of
these organizations, it appears that the
dimension of equal distribution takes
precedence in the event of conflict, unless there is some specific legislative intervention. Thus, if a given wildlife issue
primarily involves questions of equity,
then the scientific facts pertinent to the
issue will take a back seat. Conversely, if
the issue does not primarily involve
equity, then the scientific basis for decisions comes to be emphasized. However, since these two dimensions are
simultaneously present in most decisions, the scientific aspect of the problem is often used to justify a decision
that is based primarily on the goal of increased equity. At other times, an agency may appear to contradict itself by arguing against scientific fact in the name
of a perceived threat to equity. This organizational behavior has evolved chiefly because of the basic economic fact
that an increase in efficiency will reduce
equity, and vice versa (Okun, 1975).
The regulatory nature of the wildlife conservation agencies also explains
the close relationship between the hunting interest groups and Government. It
has been shown that this trend originated during the 1840's under the influence
of the philosophy of jacksonian Democracy, and that it became institutionalized under the influence of Teddy Roosevelt in the early 1900's .. lt is a cliche in
both the wildlife conservation and public administration literature to argue
that the regulatory process excludes significant segments of the public from
participating in Government. According
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ing revenues sufficient to supplement
anticipated recreational revenues. Energy development, agriculture, and urban
development were given precedence in
land management- doves, woodpeckers,
and rabbits were assumed to be worth
less per acre than oil, corn, or subdivisions. Internal audit procedures reinforced
this trend, since it was easier to show
economic progress from activities that
destroyed wild I ife habitats than from activities that restored the amount of living
space available to wild animals.
However, if we are correct in applying Weaver's model to the evolution of
wildlife management agencies, Government can expect continued revitalization by interest groups which request
that the social costs involved in enhancing the environment (and wildlife in particular) be incorporated into the prices
of goods and services. In some parts of
the United States, this trend has already
begun to appear. In Michigan there has
been a longstanding controversy over
exploration and drilling for oil and gas in
the Pigeon River Country State Forest
because this area has one of the only
two populations of elk east of the Mississippi River. The court decision on this
issue was that (1) drilling should be permitted in the southern part of the forest
only and (2) that biologists should work
with the oil industry to minimize the negative effects on the elk herd. Also, legislation was passed to earmark part of the
royalties gained from profits on the drilling operations for the purchase of lands
for wildlife elsewhere in Michigan. In addition, the oil company was ordered by
the courts to support agency research
on enhancement of wildlife values in the
State Forest. Resolutions like the above,
based on the principle that the cost of
externalities be included in the price of
oil, may represent a glimpse of things to
come.
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G i I bert (1971) proposed that the different eras in the historical development
of thinking about natural resource management coincided with changes in social theory. He proposed that an Era of
Abundance existed until 1850, because
there was little worry about supply during that period. This period was followed
by the Era of Exploitation (1850-1900)
when resource destruction occurred,
but, at the same time, restrictions to
counter preceived destruction were initiated. The next era, Preservation and Production, lasted from 1900-1935 and was
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During 1935-1970, the Era of Harvest
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philosophies arose at this time: land was
to provide the "greatest good for the
greatest number in the long run." Gilbert
denoted the next stage as the Era of
Technology, Sophistication, and Human
Management in which the users of resources, as well as the resources themselves, became the focus of attention by
managers. He speculated that we were
about to enter another Era of Exploitation, due to shortcomings in the results
achieved by the policies in force during
this last stage.
Although there are some important
differences between Gilbert's "eras"
and the stages of growth discussed in
this paper, the similarities are nevertheless clear and merit more discussion. It
has been shown that agency growth has
been principally achieved in large steps.
These stepwise increments have been
achieved by the efforts of particular interest groups, through direct communication with the responsible agencies.
Major changes in legislative appropriation for wildlife conservation have occurred most often when interest groups
and agencies have presented a unified
front in terms of policy, in conjunction
with a plan for deriving independent
revenue.
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have been used by agencies to make decisions, defend their positions, propose
innovation, and perceive newly emerging
issues. Due to the regulatory nature of
these organizations, it appears that the
dimension of equal distribution takes
precedence in the event of conflict, unless there is some specific legislative intervention. Thus, if a given wildlife issue
primarily involves questions of equity,
then the scientific facts pertinent to the
issue will take a back seat. Conversely, if
the issue does not primarily involve
equity, then the scientific basis for decisions comes to be emphasized. However, since these two dimensions are
simultaneously present in most decisions, the scientific aspect of the problem is often used to justify a decision
that is based primarily on the goal of increased equity. At other times, an agency may appear to contradict itself by arguing against scientific fact in the name
of a perceived threat to equity. This organizational behavior has evolved chiefly because of the basic economic fact
that an increase in efficiency will reduce
equity, and vice versa (Okun, 1975).
The regulatory nature of the wildlife conservation agencies also explains
the close relationship between the hunting interest groups and Government. It
has been shown that this trend originated during the 1840's under the influence
of the philosophy of jacksonian Democracy, and that it became institutionalized under the influence of Teddy Roosevelt in the early 1900's .. lt is a cliche in
both the wildlife conservation and public administration literature to argue
that the regulatory process excludes significant segments of the public from
participating in Government. According
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to our modification of Stigler's theory,
this is exactly what regulated interests
desire. Government's solution to this problem is to attempt to ensure that the actions entailed in the regulatory process
be consistent with traditional or emerging values and customs. This solution
should result in greater compliance with
regulation, greater satisfaction arising
from the increased freedom to utilize
natural resources, and greater potential
for internalizing the demands of old and
new interest groups.
Although this is the correct form of
Government behavior for a capitalistic
democracy, questions arise when the expressed will of the people is distorted,
juvenile, or potentially destructive. Regulatory agencies typically have evolved
amid precisely these kinds of conditions
and thereby serve to mediate, educate,
punish, and guide the development of
human behavior. But there may be a
new problem, created by the use of regulatory tools, i.e., an effect on ethical
values. Individuals who operate at the
highest levels of ethical behavior tend to
make moral decisions on the basis of
their own internal guidelines. In contrast, regulation emphasizes external
rules, signals, and punishments. So, it is
possible that individuals may lose- or
never develop- a capacity for making
internal value judgments under the strict
control of a regulatory system.
This dilemma is not simply a problem that relates to administrative theory. The research of Kellert and Westervelt (1981) clearly shows that there may
be a real conflict between the will of the
people and the appropriate ethical relationships between Americans and wildlife.
This article has shown that the national
attitude toward wildlife is basically one
of uti I itarian ism, and that this attitude
has been prevalent for the past 75 years.
This national norm, that animals are only of value if they can be used to fill
human needs, is an underlying public at756
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titude that requires modification. A
more acceptable attitude would be one
that emphasizes the wise use of these
resources, and a superior national standard would concentrate on responsible
and wise use.
The effectiveness of the wildliferelated bureaucracy should not be underestimated. The agencies involved
have been very successful in doing what
has been mandated to them by citizens
who vote for legislators, pay tax money
to Government, and provide testimony to
courthouses. For example, there are
twice as many deer in Michigan alone
than the 500,000 found in all of North
America in the early 1900's. Pronghorns,
which came close to facing the fate of
the bison, are now frequently sighted on
western ranges. Many raptor populations
have been successfully saved from decimation by pesticides, and several endangered species have been restored, and
even declassified from the endangered
species list through scientific management.
Also, Government's capacity for
change in responding to changing public
attitudes should not be underestimated.
We have seen that cycles of resource exploitation have been followed by political activism, bureau action, a subsequent backlash reaction, and then more
exploitation. These cycles have made
change in Government the rule rather
than the exception.
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Comments from H. McGiffin, Symposium
Coordinator of the Institute for the
Study of Animal Problems, broadened
the perspectives of this paper. This article is a contribution of Federal Aid in
Wildlife Restoration, Michigan PittmanRobertson Project W-117-R.

References
Allen, D.L. (1954) Our Wildlife Legacy.
Funk and Wagnalls, New York, NY.
Bernstein, M.H. (1955) Regulating Business by Independent Commissions.
Princeton University Press, Princeton, NJ.
Cart, T.W. (1971) The struggle for wildlife
protection in the United States.
Thesis, University of Michigan. University Microfilms, Ann Arbor, MI.
Flader, S.L. (1976) Scientific resource
management: an historical perspective. Trans N Am Wild/ Nat Resour
Conf 41:17-30.
Gilbert, D.L. (1971) Natural Resources and
Public Relations. The Wildlife
Society, Washington, DC.
Graham, E.H. (1947) The Land and Wildlife. Oxford University Press, New
York, NY.
Gustafson, A.F., H. Ries, C.H. Guise, and
W.J. Hamilton, Jr. (1940) Conservation in the United States. Comstock
Publishing Co., Inc., Cornell Heights,
Ithaca, NY.
Kellert, S.R. and M.O. Westervelt (1981)
Trends in animal use and perception

Review Article

in 20th Century America. U.S. Fish
and Wild/ Serv Nat/ Tech Serv USDA,
Springfield, VA.
Kneese, A.W. and C.L. Schultze (1975)
Pollution, Prices, and Public Policy.
The Brookings Institution, Washington, DC.
Leopold, A. (1933) Game Management.
Charles Scribner's Sons, New York,
NY.
Okun, A.M. (1975) Equality and Efficiency:
The Big Tradeoff. The Brookings Institution, Washington, DC.
Palmer, T.S. (1902) Legislation for the protection of birds other than game
birds. USDA Bioi Surv Bull, No. 12.
Palmer, T.S. (1912) Chronology and index
of American game protection, 17761911. USDA Bioi Surv Bull, No. 41.
Schoger, A.W. (1955) The Passenger Pigeon.
University of Wisconsin Press, Madison, WI.
Stigler, G.J. (1971) The theory of economic
regulation. Bell j Econ, Spring, pp.
3-21.
Trefethen, J.B. (1961) Crusade for Wildlife:
Highlights in Conservation Progress.
The Stackpole Company, Harrisburg, PA.
Trefethen, J.B. (1964) Wildlife Management and Conservation. D.C. Heath
and Company, Boston, MA.
Weaver, P.H. (1978) Regulation, social
policy, and class conflict. Pub lnt,
Winter, pp. 45-63.

Acknowledgments
The initial ideas for this article
arose from conversations with M. Bratton
of Michigan State University. Suggestions
were contributed by L. Jahn and L. Williamson of the Wildlife Management Institute and J. Berryman of the International Association of Fish and Wildlife
Agencies. I am indebted to P. Friedrich
of the Michigan Department of Natural
Resources, and T. Moe of Stanford University for insights provided in review.
/NT 1 STUD ANIM PROB 3(2) 1982

/NT 1 STUD ANIM PROB 3(2) 1982

157

E.E. Langenau-Bureaucracy and Wildlife

to our modification of Stigler's theory,
this is exactly what regulated interests
desire. Government's solution to this problem is to attempt to ensure that the actions entailed in the regulatory process
be consistent with traditional or emerging values and customs. This solution
should result in greater compliance with
regulation, greater satisfaction arising
from the increased freedom to utilize
natural resources, and greater potential
for internalizing the demands of old and
new interest groups.
Although this is the correct form of
Government behavior for a capitalistic
democracy, questions arise when the expressed will of the people is distorted,
juvenile, or potentially destructive. Regulatory agencies typically have evolved
amid precisely these kinds of conditions
and thereby serve to mediate, educate,
punish, and guide the development of
human behavior. But there may be a
new problem, created by the use of regulatory tools, i.e., an effect on ethical
values. Individuals who operate at the
highest levels of ethical behavior tend to
make moral decisions on the basis of
their own internal guidelines. In contrast, regulation emphasizes external
rules, signals, and punishments. So, it is
possible that individuals may lose- or
never develop- a capacity for making
internal value judgments under the strict
control of a regulatory system.
This dilemma is not simply a problem that relates to administrative theory. The research of Kellert and Westervelt (1981) clearly shows that there may
be a real conflict between the will of the
people and the appropriate ethical relationships between Americans and wildlife.
This article has shown that the national
attitude toward wildlife is basically one
of uti I itarian ism, and that this attitude
has been prevalent for the past 75 years.
This national norm, that animals are only of value if they can be used to fill
human needs, is an underlying public at756

Review Article

titude that requires modification. A
more acceptable attitude would be one
that emphasizes the wise use of these
resources, and a superior national standard would concentrate on responsible
and wise use.
The effectiveness of the wildliferelated bureaucracy should not be underestimated. The agencies involved
have been very successful in doing what
has been mandated to them by citizens
who vote for legislators, pay tax money
to Government, and provide testimony to
courthouses. For example, there are
twice as many deer in Michigan alone
than the 500,000 found in all of North
America in the early 1900's. Pronghorns,
which came close to facing the fate of
the bison, are now frequently sighted on
western ranges. Many raptor populations
have been successfully saved from decimation by pesticides, and several endangered species have been restored, and
even declassified from the endangered
species list through scientific management.
Also, Government's capacity for
change in responding to changing public
attitudes should not be underestimated.
We have seen that cycles of resource exploitation have been followed by political activism, bureau action, a subsequent backlash reaction, and then more
exploitation. These cycles have made
change in Government the rule rather
than the exception.

E.E. Langenau-Bureaucracy and Wildlife

Comments from H. McGiffin, Symposium
Coordinator of the Institute for the
Study of Animal Problems, broadened
the perspectives of this paper. This article is a contribution of Federal Aid in
Wildlife Restoration, Michigan PittmanRobertson Project W-117-R.

References
Allen, D.L. (1954) Our Wildlife Legacy.
Funk and Wagnalls, New York, NY.
Bernstein, M.H. (1955) Regulating Business by Independent Commissions.
Princeton University Press, Princeton, NJ.
Cart, T.W. (1971) The struggle for wildlife
protection in the United States.
Thesis, University of Michigan. University Microfilms, Ann Arbor, MI.
Flader, S.L. (1976) Scientific resource
management: an historical perspective. Trans N Am Wild/ Nat Resour
Conf 41:17-30.
Gilbert, D.L. (1971) Natural Resources and
Public Relations. The Wildlife
Society, Washington, DC.
Graham, E.H. (1947) The Land and Wildlife. Oxford University Press, New
York, NY.
Gustafson, A.F., H. Ries, C.H. Guise, and
W.J. Hamilton, Jr. (1940) Conservation in the United States. Comstock
Publishing Co., Inc., Cornell Heights,
Ithaca, NY.
Kellert, S.R. and M.O. Westervelt (1981)
Trends in animal use and perception

Review Article

in 20th Century America. U.S. Fish
and Wild/ Serv Nat/ Tech Serv USDA,
Springfield, VA.
Kneese, A.W. and C.L. Schultze (1975)
Pollution, Prices, and Public Policy.
The Brookings Institution, Washington, DC.
Leopold, A. (1933) Game Management.
Charles Scribner's Sons, New York,
NY.
Okun, A.M. (1975) Equality and Efficiency:
The Big Tradeoff. The Brookings Institution, Washington, DC.
Palmer, T.S. (1902) Legislation for the protection of birds other than game
birds. USDA Bioi Surv Bull, No. 12.
Palmer, T.S. (1912) Chronology and index
of American game protection, 17761911. USDA Bioi Surv Bull, No. 41.
Schoger, A.W. (1955) The Passenger Pigeon.
University of Wisconsin Press, Madison, WI.
Stigler, G.J. (1971) The theory of economic
regulation. Bell j Econ, Spring, pp.
3-21.
Trefethen, J.B. (1961) Crusade for Wildlife:
Highlights in Conservation Progress.
The Stackpole Company, Harrisburg, PA.
Trefethen, J.B. (1964) Wildlife Management and Conservation. D.C. Heath
and Company, Boston, MA.
Weaver, P.H. (1978) Regulation, social
policy, and class conflict. Pub lnt,
Winter, pp. 45-63.

Acknowledgments
The initial ideas for this article
arose from conversations with M. Bratton
of Michigan State University. Suggestions
were contributed by L. Jahn and L. Williamson of the Wildlife Management Institute and J. Berryman of the International Association of Fish and Wildlife
Agencies. I am indebted to P. Friedrich
of the Michigan Department of Natural
Resources, and T. Moe of Stanford University for insights provided in review.
/NT 1 STUD ANIM PROB 3(2) 1982

/NT 1 STUD ANIM PROB 3(2) 1982

157

